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easy comprehensibility of the relevancy doctrine, there remains a conscious
feeling that additional safeguards to one's privacy are requisite.
Perhaps the extension of the Gouled rule into the field of wiretapping and
other secretive hearing devices would be desirable. It is in this field that safeguards to the search are lacking, there being no necessity for obtaining search
warrants. A more rigorous application of the rule in the sedition area may also
be advisable. But shortcomings to this rule may render any application ineffective, because the rule leaves officers in the dark as far as knowledge of the precise limits to seizure is concerned. There exists the additional question of whether such a judicial rule would have any real deterrent effect upon law enforcement officers. In addition to these two practical objections to the extension of'
the rule into other areas, there is the further objection that the Gouled rule lacks
an acceptable rationale. But this objection is not necessarily decisive. As Justice
Learned Hand has said, "Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances,
real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go par passu with
the supposed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past."85
COMMUNISTS AND THE RIGHT TO BAIL
The usually tranquil law of bail has been recently disturbed by a surprising
number of cases illustrating the sharp test put to civil liberties conceptions by
the Communist problem. Proceedings against subversives under the Smith
Act' and the Internal Security Act of 19502 have brought variations in previously routine and unquestioned bail procedures. Within the bail framework, constitutional values and practical possibilities of martyrdom compete with concern
for the security of the nation. The haven offered by sympathetic foreign governments and the nature of the international Communist conspiracy seem to promote escape. 3 The government's challenge of the traditional rules of bail has
raised difficult problems of policy and justice.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the response of the federal
courts to these considerations in four situations regarding bail: (1) prior to conviction; (2) pending appeal; (3) in deportation proceedings; and (4) in examin4
ing the qualifications of a proffered surety.

11United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
154 Stat. 670 (1940), as amended, 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. 2385 (1951).
264 Stat. 987 (1950) (Subversives Activities Control Act of 1950; the McCarran Act).
3

Gerhardt Eisler jumped bail and was, until his recent removal from office, an important
official in the East German government. As stated in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951),
"The government asks the courts to depart from the norm by assuming, without introduction of evidence, that each petitioner is a pawn in a conspiracy and will, in obedience to a
superior, flee the jurisdiction." But compare the reception of the same argument when advanced in a deportation proceeding.
4In relating the cases, it may be helpful to keep in mind the following sequence of events
which have seemed to tighten the government's case: outbreak of Korean hostilities, June 25,
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Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave an absolute right to bail in noncapital
cases,' the federal courts have never had to decide whether or not the right is
one guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. However, the Eighth Amendment
dearly governs the amount of bail by directing that "excessive bail shall not be
required." In regard to this command, it has been stated: "The reasonableness
of the amount is to be determined by properly striking a balance between the
need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular
accused."'
In the recent case of Stack v. Boyle, the district court, acting after the flight
of four of the defendants in Dennis v. United States, 7 departed from the usual
considerations in determining amount and set the recognizance at $50,000 for
each of twelve defendants charged with violation of the Smith Act. 8 After the
hearing on the defendants' motion to reduce bail, the court based its decision
upon the only evidence offered by the government, "that four persons previously convicted under the Smith Act in the Southern District of New York had
forfeited bail." 9 The Court of Appeals found the district court's ruling not
clearly erroneous. 10 Reversing, the Supreme Court remanded and ruled that in
the absence of a hearing with special evidence as to each defendant individually,
1950; opinion of the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), upholding
the constitutionality of the Smith Act, June 4, 1951; and the flight of four of the Dennis defendants, July 2, 1951, N.Y. Times, p. 1, col. 1 (July 4, 1951).
5

The case of Rowan v. Randolph, 268 Fed. 527 (C.A. 7th, 1920),held that even a record

of prior escapes does not justify denial of bail. Today this right is given meaning in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide: Rule 46(a)(1). "Aperson arrested for an offense
not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail" before conviction.
6United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F. 2d 1002, 1004 (C.A. 2d, 1946). Rule
46(c), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., provides: "Amount. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the
amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or
justice will insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of
the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant."

341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8342 U.S. 1 (1951). These defendants have since been found guilty in the district court.
N.Y. Times, p. 1, col. 2 (Aug. 6, 1952).
Ibid., at 3. The four were Hall, Thompson, Winston and Green. Hall has since been apprehended and convicted, while serving sentence, of contempt for jumping bail. United

States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d 726 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
10Stack v. Boyle, 192 F. 2d 56 (C.A. 9th, 1951). After the motion to reduce bail had been
denied in the District Court, the defendants applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After a
hearing, the District Court denied this petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground
that an appeal of the motion to reduce, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, was the
proper remedy. This affirmation was on the alternative ground that the finding of the District
Court was not clearly erroneous.
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the unusual amount could not be squared with the statutory and constitutional
standards." The issue to be determined in such a hearing is what amount will
insure the presence of the defendant and still give him a chance to remain free
until conviction. Where proper consideration of these factors in relation to each
defendant is absent, discretion is abused.u
This decision of the Supreme Court is in line with the usual treatment of discretionary powers of a trial judge: a determination of a discretionary question
without reference to the purpose of the right in question is abuse of discretion,
is error, and is reversible error if prejudicial. 3 In the Stack case, the district
judge had, in effect, tried to supplement the authorized procedure for restricting
and prosecuting Communists by setting the amount of the bail bond unusually
high. Under the Supreme Court ruling, if the prosecution desires a high bail
bond it must carry the burden of proving the need for special inducement to
4
insure the presence of the accused.
The force of this decision in preventing the detention of Communists by
arbitrary judicial action can best be seen by following the case back to the trial
judge to see the difficulties encountered by him as he tried to conform to the
standards set by the Supreme Court and, at the same time, to affirm the
$50,000 amount for each defendant." When the defendants in the Stack case
again moved to reduce bail, Judge Mathes held an extensive hearing on evidence
relative to each defendant. The judge, in his opinion, gave prolonged consideration to each of the factors set out by the statute to be relevant. 0 Quoting at
length from the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States on the
dangers of Communists, he found the amount to be reasonable.
But this time the Court of Appeals did not affirm the denial of the motion to
reduce. 17Instead, they reduced the amount to $10,000 or less for each defendant,
holding that the government had failed to show the necessary special circumstances. The Court of Appeals attacked the reasoning of Judge Mathes at three
points. He had inferred the reasonable probability of guilt merely from the fact
11The Supreme Court agreed that habeas corpus was not the proper method of raising the
question but considered the merits of the defendants' claim anyway, pointing out the necessity
for speed in bail proceedings.
"Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951): "Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment."
13See, e.g., Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902); Bowles v. Goebel, 151 F. 2d 671, 674
(C.A. 8th, 1945): "Discretion in a legal sense necessarily is the responsible exercise of official
conscience on all the facts of a particular situation in light of the purpose for which it exists."
14An example of what must be shown is given by Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F. 2d 729, 731
(C.A. 10th, 1939): "It appears that he was charged with two felonious offenses and was a
parole violator. In view of these facts, we cannot say the [$10,000] bail was excessive."
15 United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal., 1951).
16Statute quoted in note 6 supra.
17Spector v. United States, 193 F. 2d 1002 (C.A. 9th, 1952); memo decision, Stack v.
United States, 192 F. 2d 875 (C.A. 9th, 1951).
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of indictment.' He had drawn an adverse inference from the refusal of the defendants to answer certain questions about their employment under a claim of
privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, he had inferred from the Dennis decision that all Communists are dangerous. Each of these conclusions was held
to be error. The Dennis decision, said the Court of Appeals, must not be taken
to hold that all Communists advocate the overthrow of the government by
force. It is fundamental law that a finding of fact is not binding upon persons
not parties to the action.19 These errors in the reasoning of the District Court
led it to conclude that the government had shown sufficient special circumstances for unusually high bail. The conclusion fell with the reasoning. The action of the Court of Appeals is analogous to a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict by the trier of fact, Judge Mathes.20 Thus it appears that a hearing to
set bail, whether for Communists or others, must conform to the usual due
process requirements of an individual hearing with enough evidence to make
the judgment reasonable.
Since congressional action to limit the right of Communists to bail is a distinct possibility, it may be proper to conjecture as to the constitutionality of
such legislation. It has been argued that the proscription of "excessive bail" in
the Eighth Amendment is meaningless unless it presupposes that some bail
must be granted. 2 ' Yet Congress long ago limited the right to bail to noncapital
cases, which seems to indicate that the constitutional check, if there is one, does
not limit the legislature. The drafters of the Amendment chose oblique language
indeed if they intended an absolute guarantee of bail. It is more likely that the
Amendment presupposed the familiar English common-law rules as to the
availability of bail. The English Bill of Rights Act," the ancestor of our bail
clause, did not give a right to bail but merely prohibited excessive bail.3 The
English law clearly permitted the legislature to determine the classes of cases in
13 The trial court's deduction was probably one of membership in the Communist party
which was better supported by the evidence at the hearing; but this, by the third error mentioned in the text, will not support the further inference of probable guilt under the Smith
Act.
19 Spector v. United States, 193 F. 2d 1002, 1006 (C.A. 9th, 1952): "Here again is clear error,
for no principle of stare decisis or res judicata makes a finding of fact applicable to persons not
parties to the action in which the finding is made."
20 The defendants were ordered released by the Court of Appeals on usual recognizance.
This is consonant with the desire for speed in bail cases. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951).
21In his dissent in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952), Mr. Justice Black urges
that the implied guarantee of the Amendment is a check upon both courts and legislature.
As to the implied check upon the courts if Congress were to leave bail to judicial discretion, it
would still seem to be constitutional to deny bail in proper case. But see Hudson v. Parker,
156 U.S. 277 (1895); United States v. Motlow, 10 F. 2d 657 (C.A. 7th, 1926); McKnight v.
United States, 113 Fed. 451 (C.A. 6th, 1902).
2"1 Wm. & Mary Ir, c. 2, § 1(10) (1689).
2"See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).
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which bail should be mandatory or unavailable In all other cases bail was at
the reasonable discretion of the courts and the question of reasonableness was
reviewable by writ of habeas corpus.n It seems, then, that the Eighth Amendment is an order to judges that they shall not evade the common-law requirement, restated in American statute, to give bail in proper cases by setting the
amount too high. Today statute requires that bail be allowed before conviction
in noncapital cases, but there is no constitutional obstacle to legislation removing bail altogether in given classes of cases or once more making the grant of bail
a matter of judicial discretion in each case.
II
Admission to bail pending appeal, in contrast to bail before conviction, is at
the discretion of the court. It "may be allowed. 2' 8 However, a liberal exercise
of that discretion has long been accepted practice,2 7 with the defendant being
entitled to a reasonable judicial determination of the bail question2 8 If a substantial question is present, then only in case of great probability of escape or a
serious danger of repetition of an atrocious crime should bail be refused 9
In September, 1950, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, was asked in
Williamson v. UnitedStates'0 to revoke the bail of Communists pending appeal.
The government's argument was that the defendants, convicted below under
the Smith Act, with conviction affirmed by the instant court in United States v.
Dennis," "have pursued and will continue to pursue a course of conduct and activity dangerous to the public welfare and National security of the United
States."32 A change in the danger presented by the defendants had been caused
by the onset of the Korean conflict. The Court of Appeals referred the problem
to the Circuit Justice by allowing a thirty day extension of bail. Mr. Justice
24 1 Steffen, History of Criminal Law in England 234-36 (1883); Qasem, Bail and Personal
Liberty, 30 Can. Bar Rev. 378, 380-81 (1952).
25 Consult Qasem, ibid., at 390-93.
26Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 46(a) (2). "Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari only
if it appears that the case involves a substantial question which should be determined by the
appellate court."
27 United States v. St. John, 254 F. 794, 796 (C.A. 7th, 1918): "In fact bail has been so
frequently granted after conviction that an erroneous impression has obtained with the bar
that it is allowed as a matter of right."
28 "Detention pending the writ is only for the purpose of securing attendance of the convicted person after the determination of his proceedings in error. If this can or will be done by
requiring bail, there is no excuse for refusing or denying such relief." McKnight v. United
States, 113 F. 451, 453 (C.A. 6th, 1902). See United States v. Motlow, 10 F. 2d 657 (C.A. 7th,
1926).
29See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895); Rossi v. United States, 11 F. 2d 264, 465
(C.A. 8th, 1926); Baker v. United States, 139 F. 2d 721, (C.A. 8th, 1944).
30184 F. 2d 280 (C.A. 2d, 1950), noted in 64 Harv. L. Rev. 662 (1951).
31United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
- 184 F. 2d 280, 281 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
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Jackson first found that there was a substantial question for review by the Supreme Court, namely the constitutionality of the Smith Act. In answer to the
government's public welfare argument, he doubted whether a repetition of the
alleged actions, with the admitted substantial question as to guilt, would justify
revocation of the bail. 33 Not resting on this ground, Mr. Justice Jackson said of
the activities complained of, "I find them to consist entirely of making speeches
and writing articles .... They do not contain any advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. 13 4 Finding neither precedent nor convincing reasons
for the judiciary "to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses," the Justice upheld the admission of the defendants to bail pending appeal to the Supreme Court.3 1
The Williamson opinion reaffirmed the traditional position that bail pending
appeal, when a substantial question is present, is at the discretion of the deciding official, who is to be overruled only when the discretion is abused. 36 Going
further, the Ninth Circuit, in Bridges v. UnitedStates, 37 had said one month before, "where a meritorious question exists, bail becomes a matter of right, not
of grace." 38 In response to this statement, Mr. Justice Jackson said in the
Williamson opinion, "I cannot accept this view that the presence of a substantial question makes bail mandatory... Tjhe Rule permits bail only in circumstances warranted by sound judicial discretion." 9 To support this view,
Justice Jackson pointed out the change made during the drafting of the rule
from "Bail shall be allowed" to "Bail may be allowed" pending appeal. Whether
3 Ibid., at 283: "Another difficulty with the government's position ...is that while a
substantial question exists as to whether they have been lawfully convicted it is equally doubtful whether repetition, if it be such, is a crime."
34 Ibid., at 283 n. 8, says further, "The Smith Act purports to authorize prosecution of
publication with intent to cause overthrow of the Government. Section 2(a) (2), 54 Stat. 671.
These defendants were not indicted under this section." The fact that Mr. Justice Jackson
upheld the Communists' right to bail even though later he took a serious view of that conspiracy in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 (1951), is encouraging to those fearing
destruction of our civil liberties.
"1A decision in the Ninth Circuit a month earlier, Bridges v. United States, 184 F. 2d 881
(C.A. 9th, 1950), had set forth the same arguments as the Williamson opinion. The government unsuccessfully argued that the status of a bailed defendant should be assimilated to a
person on probation. Even with the Korean hostilities, the fear for the interests of the United
States was held to be insufficient ground to deny bail to Bridges.
United States v. Motlow, 10 F. 2d 657 (C.A. 7th, 1926); Zydok v. Butterfield, 187 F. 2d
802 (C.A. 6th, 1951) (an immigration case). The Allowance of Bail Pending Appeal, 31 B.U.L.
Rev. 244 (1951).
37 184 F. 2d 881 (C.A. 9th, 1950).
38Ibid., at 884. The earlier precedent relied on was a general statement in Hudson v.
Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895): "The statutes of the United States have been framed upon
the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has finally been adjudged guilty in
the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment,
but may be admitted to bail, not only after arrest and before trial, but after conviction and
pending writ of error."
39Williamson v. United States, 184 F. 2d 280 n. 4 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
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the Ninth Circuit merely failed to distinguish right to bail from right to reasonable exercise of judicial discretion is left in doubt. Nevertheless, by the better
view, 40 if a substantial question as to guilt exists bail can be denied pending
appeal on reasonable proof that the defendant will not be producible for sentence if bailed.
The courts consciously use the "substantial question" bail requirement to
discourage delay through frivolous appeals.4' As the area of subversive activity
becomes more clearly defined by court decisions, it is probable that the requirement of a substantial question as to guilt will become more stringent. The area
of allowable conduct could shrink to the extent that the provision for bail pending review would become a nullity for those convicted of subversive activity.
The 82d Congress has had before it legislation denying the right to bail pending appeal to persons convicted of subversive activity and setting bail at an
absurdly high amount.42The discussion of the Eighth Amendment in section I
above indicates that these measures are probably constitutional, since the prohibition of "excessive bail" was, historically, a curb only on sheriffs or judges. 3
III
With rights which depend, by their nature, on at least some discretion of
elected officials, 44 abuse is not entirely avoidable. 4 The courts have recognized
the need for speedy review of bail problems by providing for appeals from the
denial of a motion 46 or for direct applications to a higher court. Within the
limits of this system, the cases indicate that the rights of the citizen Communist to be bailed are protected as fully as those of the ordinary criminal.
However, the protection indicated by the Stack and Williamson decisions is not
equally extended to the alien.
4

0These two cases have been extensively commented on with the uniform conclusion that
the Williamson view is the correct interpretation of the statute. E.g., see notes in 64 Harv. L.
Rev. 662 (1951); 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 191 (1951); 3 Stanford L. Rev. 167 (1950).
4'
See D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F. 2d 271 (C.A. 9th, 1950); United States v. Motlow,
10 F. 2d 657 (C.A. 7th, 1926); McKnight v. United States, 113 Fed. 451 (C.A. 6th, 1902).
42
H.R. 4780, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (1951), fixes permanent bail of one million dollars for each
day a convicted Communist remains away from jail. H.R. 4776, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (1951),
provides that no person convicted of treason, sedition, subversive activities, shall be admitted
to bail or released from custody until a final judgment upon appeal. H.R. 4826, 82d Cong. 1st
Sess. (1951), prohibits bail pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of espionage, treason,
sedition, or of conspiracy to commit any such offense.
4

1

Authorities cited notes 24 and 25 supra.

44 Consult Beely, The Bail System in Chicago 160-65 (1927), for a criticism of the trend in

American law away from magisterial discretion towards definite rules and a criticism of the
usual paucity of facts on which the bail determination is made.
4
1Hawaiian District Judge Delbert E. Metzger was indirectly threatened with dismissal
by Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney when he refused to impose excessive bail on seven persons arrested
as Communists. N.Y. Times § 1,p. 12, col. 3 (Aug. 30, 1951); Judges or "Mere Instruments"?,
173 Nation 202 (Sept. 15, 1951).
46 A denial of a motion to reduce amount of bail was held to be reviewable as a final decision in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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Many constitutional rights have been extended to aliens. 47 Deportation,
however, has been clearly distinguished as a power of the sovereign free of most
constitutional limitations. 48 In Wong Wing v. United States, 1896,'4 the Supreme Court ruled that aliens could not be sentenced to hard labor in deportation proceedings, but that they could be confined without bail pending determination of their deportability.50 The Immigration Act of 1917 declared that
an alien "may be released under a bond."'" This statute was interpreted by
different circuits either as requiring the Attorney General to grant bail52 or as
giving him discretion to grant bail.53 The discretionary interpretation held that
the administrative denial of bail would be reversed where the decision was without reasonable foundation.5 4 In 1950, Congress resolved this jurisdictional split
by the wording of the new statute, "may, in the discretion of the Attorney
General be continued in custody; or be released under bond." 5
Under this new provision, in March, 1952, the Supreme Court, in Carlsonv.
Landon," approved the detention of an alien without bail pending a deportation
hearing, regardless of the time involved, upon the Attorney General's ruling
47
E.g., right to property through the 14th Amendment, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886); the privilege against self-incrimination, Schoeps v. Carmichal, 177 F. 2d 391, 400
(C.A. 9th, 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914; freedom of speech, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135 (1945).
"1Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). See Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896).
49 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
0Ibid., at 235: "We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the
means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would
be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in
custody pending the inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being
made for their deportation."
5139 Stat. 890 (1917), 8 U.S.C.A. § 156 (1942). A like provision in the Immigration Act of
1907, § 20, 34 Stat. 904, 905 (1907), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 156 (Supp., 1951), was the first
permissive bail in deportation proceedings.
11 Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d 422 (C.A. 6th, 1926).
53 United States ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 177 F. 2d 708 (C.A. 2d, 1949); United
States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F. 2d 747 (C.A.
2d, 1948); United States ex rel. Zapp v. Dist. Director of Immigration &Naturalization, 120 F.
2d 762(C.A. 2d, 1941).
54United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F.
2d 747, 751 (C.A. 2d, 1948): "The discretion of the Attorney General which we held to exist
in the Zapp case is interpreted as one which is to be reasonably exercised upon a consideration
of such factors, among others, as probability of the alien being found deportable, the seriousness of the charge against him, if proved, the danger to the public safety of his presence within
the community, and the alien's availability for subsequent proceedings if enlarged on bail."
61Internal Security Act of 1950, at § 23, 64 Stat. 1010 (1950), 8 U.S.C.A. 156(a) (Supp.,
1951): "Pending final determination of deportability of an alien taken into custody under
warrant of the Attorney General, such alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General
(1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond... ; or (3) be released on conditional parole."
56342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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that he is a threat or danger to the public interest. The mere showing of Communist party membership was found to be sufficient to make the exercise of the
Attorney General's discretion reasonable, for the Internal Security Act made
Communist party membership alone sufficient ground for deportation.67 This
holding is in direct contrast to the emphasis in the Stack decision on a personalized hearing. In its attempt to justify this legislative invasion of what is
arguably a constitutional right, the Carlson majority opinion goes very far in
advancing the very arguments, such as the concept of a continuous political
crime which is certain to be continued, which have been so vigorously rejected
by the Court in other contexts. "Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation proceedings."68
Two other provisions of the Internal Security Act have been applied to the
right of an alien to bail. The Act provides for exclusion or deportation for confidential reasons on certification by the Attorney General that the secrecy is in
the national interest. 9 This provision had been substantially embodied in a
wartime presidential proclamation. 0 In 1949 this executive power was used to
allow denial of motions for bail on confidential reasons." Naturally, if secrecy
is to be obtained, it must be present at all stages of a proceeding. The remaining
provision of the act which has been applied to a bail problem is that which
orders the Attorney General, if he is unable to deport an alien six months after
the final order, to release the alien under supervision.62 In the 1952 case of
Mezei v. Skaughnessy, 8 the Second Circuit extended the provision beyond its
literal protection of deportable aliens to include exclusion proceedings. The
relator, attempting to enter the country, had been detained on Ellis Island for
twenty-two months after a final exclusion order based on secret reasons, because
57 64 Stat. 1006 (1950), 8 U.S.C.A. § 137(2), (6) and § 137-3(a) (Supp., 1951).
18 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). The decision was 5 to 4. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on
grounds of statutory interpretation, pointing out, "Moreover, in deportation cases-as compared, for example, with prosecutions under the Smith Act-the consideration that the individuals concerned may depart from the country is minimized in significance, first, because
compulsory departure from the United States is just what they are contesting, and secondly,
if they do depart, the purpose of the deportation proceedings is realized." Ibid., at 558, 563.
59 64 Stat. 1006 (1950), 8 U.S.C.A. § 137-4 (Supp., 1951).
60 Presidential Proclamation No. 2523 (1941), authorized by 40 Stat. 559 (1918), as amended, 55 Stat. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C.A. § 223 (1941). Applied to effect deportation in Knauff v.
Watkins, 173 F. 2d 559 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
61
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
64 Stat. 1010 (1950), 8 U.S.C.A. § 156(a), (b) (Supp., 1951). Former case law held that
conditions of supervision other than bail could not be required, and that bail was mandatory.
Petition of Brooks, 5 F. 2d 238 (D.C. Mass., 1925); United States ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls,
47 F. Supp. 201 (D.C. Mass., 1942). Bail during the six month period is at the discretion of
the Attorney General. United States ex rel. Dzuro v. Dist. Director of Immigration &Naturalization, 102 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. N.Y., 1951).
63 195 F. 2d 964 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
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no country could be found willing to accept
him. The court ordered a new hear4
ing to set reasonable conditions of bail.1
The extent of the judicial abdication of power to review bail determined by
the Attorney General is not clear in the Carlsondecision. The cases before the
Internal Security Act of 1950 had held that the discretion of the Attorney General was reviewable, much the same as bail determination in criminal cases. The
Court in the Carlson case said, "We think the discretion [to allow bail] reposed
in the Attorney General is at least as great as that found by the Second Circuit
in the Potash"5 case to be in him under the former bail provision. It can only be
overridden where it is clearly shown that it 'was without reasonable foundation.' ,,6" In sympathy with the arguments of special danger, the Court seems
to have devised a new purpose of bail: "Hearings are had, and [the Attorney
General] must justify his refusal of bail by reference to the legislative scheme to
'8 7
eradicate the evils of Communist activity.
IV
Besides setting the amount higher than a defendant can meet, or denying
bail altogether, courts have, at times, virtually denied bail to a prisoner by
disqualifying the surety or the bond offered. In view of the trend in the United
States toward professional bonding companies and cash bail,68 the assertion of
this power by the courts against Communists may seem unjust. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46(d), provides:
A person required or permitted to give bail shall execute a bond for his appearance.
One or more sureties may be required, cash or bonds or notes of the United States
may be accepted and in proper cases no security need be required.
Classically, bail is a three party transaction.69 In consideration for the surety's promise secured by a money bond that he will produce the defendant in
court on the named day, the state agrees to release the accused into the private
custody of the surety.70 The practice of releasing a suspected criminal into
private custody has a very long history in Anglo-American law, having originated in the tribal customs of the Saxons at a time when private persons were
64Ibid., at 968: "That no explicit provision is applicable in exclusion proceedings against
aliens not already admitted does not, we think, signify another policy as to such persons."
Judge L. Hand, dissenting at 970, argues that the distinction should be made: "I do not believe
that an alien so situated can force us to admit him at all."
1,United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F.
2d 747 (C.A. 2d, 1948).
6
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952).
' 7 Ibid., at 543. Accord: United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Director of Immigration &
Naturalization, quoted op. cit. supra note 54.
68 In re Carter, 192 F. 2d 15, 17-20 (App. D.C., 1951), discusses a professional bonding
company statute, D.C. Code (1940), §§ 23-602, 23-608.
1,See Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 13 (1869).
70
Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F. 2d 40 (C.A. 5th, 1931).
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probably the only available guardians.7 ' Later the motivation became the desire
to avoid imprisonment of an accused before final conviction.
The private jailor concept of the surety is retained with full vigor in England.72 In the United States, though, there has been a trend towards a mere
money contract, which has been justified by the frequent difficulty in our society of readily finding a willing personal surety. The surety does not, indeed
cannot, act as a literal jailor, though he does have affirmative duties and powers
over his principal.73 An indication of this trend towards a money concept is the
emergence of professional bonding companies giving bail as a business. Another
sign of the trend is the power of the determining body, at its discretion, to
dispense with the surety altogether and require only cash bail. Under this procedure, the defendant posts his own bond and assumes the loss if he should
abscond. Similarly, it is no longer against public policy in many jurisdictions
for the accused to indemnify his surety, thus shifting the risk of loss to him78
76
self.7 4 The mere money concept is not law, however. Both financial and moral
qualifications are demanded of the surety.
The most prominent case rejecting the concept of the surety as a substitute
jailor is Leary v. United States." There the Supreme Court rejected the commonlaw rule invalidating a private contract of indemnity between a criminal defendant and his bail, saying, "The interest to produce the body of the principal
7

The Queen Against Badger, Esq., and Cartwright, Clerk, [1843] 4 Q.B. 468, 472: "The
law is clear, and is as old as the Statute of Westminster the First, 3 Ed. 1, c. 15. Lord Coke, in
his commentary upon that statute, (2 Inst. 191), says that 'to deny a man plevin that is plevisable and thereby detain him in prison is a great offense, and grievously to be punished.' And
Lord Hale adopts the same remark: and Hawkins (Part 2, c. 15, s.13(b)) speaks of refusals of
bail as an indictable offense. Blackstone, referring, (4 Comm., c. 22, p. 297) to the ancient
statute, the Habeas Corpus, (c) and the Bill of Rights (d), calls it 'an offense against the liberty
of the subject.'"
7
Consult: Qasem, Bail and Personal Liberty, 30 Can. Bar Rev. 390-93 (1952); DeHaas,
Concepts of the Nature of Bail in English and American Criminal Law, 6 U. of Toronto L.J.
385 (1946). Indemnity contracts and corporate sureties are both forbidden, though statute
does allow discretionary cash bail: The Bail Act, 61 Vict., c. 7, § 1 (1898).
7 He has a right to arrest the principal. 62 stat. 821 (1948), 8 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (1948).
74Consult Indemnification Contracts in the Law of Bail, 35 Va. L. Rev. 496 (1949).
75 The financial requirements for the surety have been explicitly delineated. Title to all
property posted must be proved, and the court must be satisfied that the surety is financially
responsible. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 46(e): "Every surety except a corporate surety which is
approved as provided by law, shall justify by affidavit and may be required to describe in the
affidavit the property by which he proposes to justify and encumbrances thereon, the number
and amount of other bonds and undertakings for bail entered into by him and remaining undischarged, and all his other liabilities. No bond shall be approved unless the surety thereon
appears to be qualified." Corporate sureties must meet the financial requirements specified in
61 Stat. 646 (1947), 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 6-14 (Cum. Supp., 1950).
76The moral sufficiency of a bonding company is largely a matter of business honesty. If the
company can show a record of upright conduct in its business affairs and freedom from undercover connections with criminals, it fulfills the moral qualifications. In re Carter, 192 F. 2d 15
(C.A. 2d, 1951); United States v. American Bonding Co., 39 F. 2d 428 (C.A. 9th, 1930).
7 224 U.S. 567 (1912).
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in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary."78 The monetary concept of the
bail surety was carried even further in the case of Rowan v. Randolph79 where
the Seventh Circuit ruled that a district judge did not have the discretion to
refuse to accept cash bail where a money bond with surety had been ordered. 0
The effect of the Rowan decision has been negated by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically empowering the judge setting bail to require a
surety. As to the indemnity contract, it can be argued that the Leary doctrine
strengthens the need for the courts to demand morally qualified sureties: Since
the escaped defendant is to pay for the forfeited bond, only a moral obligation
will give the surety any function. The basic fact that the surety does not keep
close watch over the principal, however, lends strong force to the Leary position.
Actually, the broad Leary dictum has been rejected, as indicated by Concord
Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States."'Upholding the refusal of the bonds of
a particular surety company which had allowed prior escapes, the court said,
"When a defendant is called upon to pay his obligation to society, it is not the
sum of the bail bond that society asks for, but rather the presence of the defendant for imprisonment."8
What then remains as the function of the surety in the law of bail? Is he
merely a moral hope or perhaps a judicial tool to deny freedom by bail at will?
In contrast to other rules of bail, those governing the qualifications of a surety
were being questioned when the Communist cases brought new considerations.
Let us turn to the recent Federal cases to see how the sureties offered by Communists have been treated.
Alleged Communist affiliation was the basis of disqualification of an individual surety by the Immigration authorities in United States ex rel. Bittelman
3
v. DistrictDirectorof Immigrationand Naturalization."
The defendant had been
arrested for deportation as a Communist. The individual surety offered was
eminently qualified except that his union was a member of the International
Workers' Order, which is on the Attorney General's proscribed list of subversive
organizations.8 4 The district court held that the denial of bail on that ground
alone was an abuse of discretion.
The Bittelman ruling is an example of the principle that questions concerning
78Ibid., at 575, thus overruling such cases as United States v. Simmons, 47 Fed. 575 (S.D*
N.Y., 1891), where bail was refused on the ground that the indemnity contract disqualified the
bail.
79268 F. 529 (C.A. 7th, 1920). The statute construed is the former bail provision, Rev.
Stat. §§ 1014, 1015 (1878).
80Accord: United States v. Widen, 38 F. 2d 517 (N.D. Ill.,
1930).
8169 F. 2d 78 (C.A. 2d, 1934).

nIbid., at 81. See also United States v. American Bonding Co., 39 F. 2d 428 (C.A. 9th,
1930).
83 99 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. N.Y., 1951), a proceeding under the Internal Security Act of 1950.
8t
His first proffered surety, the Civil Rights Congress, had been refused.
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the qualifications of the surety are not to be decided in advance as by disqualifying a class.8 5 Of course, if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the
proposed surety intends to secure the escape of the defendant, 8 or if the surety
has a record of allowing prior escapes, 7 he may be rejected. In Christoffel v.
United States,88 the Civil Rights Congress was rejected as a source of a money
bond because of prior escapes of criminals bailed to them. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that, since the bail order had made a surety optional,
the qualifications of the source of deposited money or bonds cannot be questioned. The Government had changed its attitude toward Christoffel with the
onset of the Korean war and sought this indirect way of revoking bail. To the
extent of disqualifying this one source of money, the government was successful.
However, the court refused to issue a new order requiring a surety, or to revoke
bail altogether, on the same reasons as the Second Circuit advanced in the
Williamson case."' The prosecution failed to show the necessary probability of
escape. If Christoffel could find a new source of money, the original bail order
was still effective. The basic purpose of bail was upheld: freedom on such conditions as give good probability of reappearance.
In United States v. Flynn,9" bail posted by the Civil Rights Congress was revoked when the trustees of the bail fund refused to answer questions relating to
the ultimate source of the fund. The court argued that the trustees' refusal revealed a "disregard of their responsibilities as sureties for the discovery and
presentation before the court of their principals."'" The court might have
argued that bail funds donated to the surety by other persons without consideration provide no incentive to produce the accused, since the surety bears
no risk of loss.9 2 The court's disregarding of the Communist affiliation is in line
with the Bittelman rejection of that argument two weeks later.
85"But to say in advance that no individual surety will be accepted is to prejudge that
issue which he is entitled to tender and have decided in good faith." United States v. Mule,
40 F. 2d 503 (C.A. 2d, 1930).
88
United States v. Lee, 170 Fed. 613 (S.D. Ohio, 1909).
87 Concord Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 69 F. 2d 78 (C.A. 2d, 1934).
88 196 F. 2d 560 (App. D.C., 1951).
89Ibid., "... . the court cannot properly revoke the order or by modification add to the
conditions defined therein except upon a showing of the existence of factors which may lessen
the dependability of the appearance of Christoffel when required to appear."
90190 F. 2d 672 (C.A. 2d, 1951).
91
Ibid., at 673. The trustees' reluctance can probably be explained on the ground that disclosure would have implicated many donors who preferred to remain anonymous. In United
States v. Field, Hammett, & Hunton, 193 F. 2d 92 (C.A. 2d, 1951), the proposed sureties were
cited for contempt for the refusal. As a defense to the contempt proceedings, the three defendants invoked their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. However, the court
held that the privilege had been abrogated when the defendants undertook the bail contract.
9See United States v. Lee, 170 Fed. 613 (S.D. Ohio, 1909). But cf. United States v. Werner,
47 F. 2d 351 (N.D. Okla., 1931), where donated bail funds were treated as the defendant's own
money.
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Thus the federal courts have spoken on the purpose and duties of the surety.
Yet, is any real function served by shifting the issue from the character of the
defendant to the morals of the source of the bond? As in the Christoffel case,
there can occasionally be a relatively rapid determination of the acceptability
of a particular surety based on past conduct. By the licensing of bonding companies, perhaps many hearings are condensed into one. The character of the
surety, at least, need only be considered once. In a hope of improving the determination of the issue of the surety's character, further growth of appellate
rules to govern the magisterial discretion can be expected.
The possibility of disqualifying a defendant's only surety may deprive him
of his right to bail prior to conviction. Resolutions introduced in the 82d Congress proposed the automatic disqualification of any surety known to have
affiliations with any organizations listed as subversive by the Attorney General.9 3 The Civil Rights Congress has been found to lack the qualifications of a
proper surety by federal courts. 4 Perhaps a surety's subversive character or
record of permitting prior escapes should have no bearing upon allowing the
surety to post bond for a defendant. Sureties do not act as jailors despite the
resurrection of the jailor concept by the courts; the relevant consideration is
the character of the defendant, not the surety. It may be argued that, while
sureties do not perform a jailor function, they do, in effect, wager their money
that a defendant will not flee, and that therefore a morally qualified surety acts
as a short-cut, bonded trier of fact in deciding whether to post bond for a particular defendant. There are two answers to this argument: (1) Since the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee bail prior to conviction in noncapital
cases, denying bail through disqualification of the only available surety runs
counter to the statutory guarantee; 5 (2) It is quite possible that "reputable"
sureties refuse to post bond for a Communist defendant not through fear that
he will escape but through fear of public disapproval or personal aversion to
alleged subversives.
V
The impact of the Smith Act and the Internal Security Act cases upon the
traditional law of bail does not seem to have altered the law significantly in most
areas. The right to bail before conviction has been reaffirmed despite the gov9
1 H.R. 5041, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (1951) prevents the taking of bail which originates with
subversive individuals or organizations, and prohibits bail, pending appeal or certiorari, after
conviction of espionage, treason, sedition or subversive activities. H.R. 4821, 82d Cong. 1st
Sess. (1951) provides that bail shall not be taken from a surety listed as subversive by the
Attorney General of the United States.
14 Christoffel v. United States, 196 F. 2d 560 (App. D.C., 1951); United States ex rel.
Bittelman v. District Director of Immigration &Naturalization, 99 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. N.Y.,
1951).
16Many state constitutions make bail mandatory before conviction. Under such provisions,
a captious disqualification of surety has been found unconstitutional. Ex Parte Stegman, 163
At]. 422, 427 (N.J., 1932); Ex Parte Ruef, 8 Cal. App. 468, 469-70, 97 Pac. 89, 90 (1908).
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emiment's arguments that the Korean war, the Dennis case, and the flight of
four of the Dennis defendants have indicated the danger posed to our society
by Communists, the nature of their conspiracy and the likelihood of flight. In
the face of the same government arguments, bail has been extended to Smith
Act defendants pending appeal where a substantial question for review existed.
Interestingly, however, these same arguments have proved effective in alien
deportation cases. Although the arguments seem no more convincing in this
area, the denial of bail to deportees is unexceptional on precedent. The vice lies
in the law concerning aliens, not in that of bail for Communists. The only area
in which it is arguable that the Communist problem has caused the courts to
change their attitude on bail is that of disqualification of sureties. The unrealistic jailor concept of the surety seemed almost to have been discarded when
it was revived to ju.stify disqualification in Communist cases. With the possible
exception of the surety cases, then, the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, have resisted remarkably well the pressure to alter the rules of
bail to disadvantage unpopular defendants.

